Some electronic commerce transactions are inherently performed between more than two parties. In this context, it is thus important to determine whether the underlying fair exchange protocols allowing the secure implementation of such transactions enable participants to exclude other entities from a protocol execution. This is an important point that has not been sufficiently addressed when analysing such kind of protocols, and that may be crucial for the successful accomplishment of multi-party electronic transactions. In this paper we define the properties related to exchange protocols and exclusions, study exclusion scenarios on two wellknown multi-party fair exchange protocols and point out the implications that exclusions may have on the trust relationships between participants, and, more generally, on electronic commerce. Two new protocols more robust than existing multi-party fair exchange protocols are therefore proposed.
Introduction
The important growth of open networks such as the Internet has led to the study of related security problems. Achieving the exchange of electronic information (as in contract signing, certified email, etc.) is one of these security challenges. An exchange protocol allows therefore two or more parties to exchange electronic information. Informally, if the exchange is realised in such a way that, at the end of the protocol, either any honest participant has received all the expected items corresponding to the items he has provided or no participant has received anything, then the exchange protocol is said to be fair.
A trusted third party (TTP) is often used in order to help the participants to successfully realise the exchange. Depending on its level of involvement in a protocol, a TTP can be said to be online or offline. Online trusted third parties are involved in each instance of a protocol. On the contrary, an offline TTP is used when the participants in a protocol are assumed to be honest enough not to need external help in order to achieve fairness. In this case, the TTP will be involved only if a problem emerges. Since it is assumed that problems occur rarely, such protocols are called optimistic.
Many fully electronic commerce transactions are based on an underlying fair exchange protocol (e.g. electronic payments, electronic barter, etc.). When more than two parties take part in an exchange protocol, the protocol is said to be multi-party.
Applications to electronic commerce
Protocols achieving exchanges of information have applications to electronic commerce, as they provide a general framework for the implementation of many types of electronic commerce scenarios. Indeed, these protocols allow the realisation of secure exchanges between parties. By secure exchange we mean that, at the end of the exchange, no party has to be in an advantageous position compared to other parties. This kind of secure exchanges often appears in electronic commerce. For example (1) realising an electronic purchase needs the secure exchange of a payment for an electronic good or for a legal promise of delivery; (2) spending electronic money consists in the secure exchange of electronic money for an electronic good, a promise of delivery or just a receipt; (3) signing a digital contract consists in a secure exchange of the digital signature of each signer on the given contract; and (4) realising an electronic barter requires a secure exchange of digital goods of similar value. Secure exchange protocols ensure that all the participants having provided an information (such as a payment, an electronic good, etc.) receive, in return, the information that they expect. Therefore, a protocol respecting this property is called a fair exchange protocol.
Fair exchange protocols involving two parties have been extensively studied and several solutions have been proposed in the online [15, 16, 8] as in the offline [17, 3, 6, 4, 14] case. Generalised protocols to more than two parties have also been proposed [2, 7, 5, 9, 10, 11] . These multi-party protocols can serve as a framework for implementing everyday life transactions involving several entities (e.g. a merchant, a customer, their respective banks, and even sometimes a notary) in an electronic commerce context.
More precisely, we can consider a common and generic scenario with four parties describing a ring. Let one of these parties be a customer who wants to purchase an electronic item offered by a provider; the payment is realised through the customer's and the provider's banks. This is how each participant views the exchange:
• the provider supplies the expected electronic item to the customer in exchange for having his bank crediting his account;
• the customer sends a payment authorisation to his bank in exchange for the desired electronic information offered by the provider;
• the customer's bank carries out the payment to the provider's bank in exchange for the payment authorisation sent by the customer;
• and, finally, the provider's bank credits the provider's account in exchange for the payment carried out by the customer's bank.
Another scenario is multi-party barter. In such a setting, people interested in getting rid of an electronic item they no longer use would inform a community of other people willing to perform a barter that they are ready to exchange that item for another kind of item. When a match is found between what two or more people offer and expect to receive in return, then an exchange can take place. For example, a person A (resp. B or C) can thus provide in this framework an item to a person B (resp. C or A) in exchange for another item provided by a person C (resp. A or B). One or more rings can therefore be built.
Many proposed multi-party fair exchange protocols [5, 7, 9, 10] allow to perform an exchange over a ring topology, as in the examples described above. In other words, each participant P i offers to participant P i+1 an item m i in exchange for an item m i−1 offered by participant P i−1 . Of course, all subscripts have to be read modulo n, where n is the number of participants in the exchange (we will omit this hereafter). On the other hand, in [2] a generic optimistic protocol with a general topology is described. However, during this protocol a participant may receive an affidavit from the TTP instead of the expected item. The protocol achieves then what it is called weak fairness. This kind of fairness may of course be unacceptable from a practical point of view.
In multi-party fair exchange protocols it is crucial, in order to keep the electronic commerce framework consistent, to prevent participants in a protocol from excluding other participants from the exchange. This is an important point that has not been sufficiently studied when analysing such kind of protocols, and that may be essential for the successful accomplishment of multi-party electronic transactions.
Contributions
This paper presents an in-depth study of multi-party fair exchange protocols and highlights two trust relationships that exist between participants in existing protocols: a participant having to trust a set of other parties (1) not to be excluded from a protocol execution and (2) not to exclude another group of participants without his consent.
As we will see, the first of these trust relationships may lead to a loss of fairness for the excluded participant, who loses his item without receiving the expected item in return. Its occurrence may thus prevent a protocol from being used in order to implement a practical electronic commerce scenario. The second trust relationship causes excluded participants to consider honest participants not having been excluded as dishonest entities. This may induce these excluded participants to be reluctant to perform other commercial transactions with these honest participants in the future, which will have a negative and improper impact on these honest participants' reputation.
Since these trust relationships may harm the commercial success of an electronic transaction, we propose new multi-party fair exchange protocols that reduce or, if possible, suppress these trust relationships.
Informally, we may say that an entity is excluded from a protocol execution when he is ruled out from it without his consent. In this paper we show exclusion scenarios that may take place during existing multi-party fair exchange protocols, and we highlight their resulting trust relationships between the participants involved in the protocol. We stress that these specific trust relationships do not concern the TTP possibly used in order to successfully complete the protocol, but the main entities.
This paper extends the results of two previous works [9, 10] . We define the notions related with exclusion scenarios, like those of an excluded participant, a passive conspirator excluding some other participants without his consent and a protocol not allowing participants to be excluded. We analyse two well-known protocols with an online and an offline TTP, respectively. Two attacks are described against the first protocol, showing that it is not fair and that excluded participants and passive conspirators may exist. Concerning the second protocol, when discussing about a known attack allowing to exclude participants, we show that the protocol leads to passive conspirators.
In order to avoid the flaws and weaknesses found on the two studied protocols, we present two new multi-party fair exchange protocols, with an online and an offline TTP, respectively. We show that the first protocol does not allow participants to be excluded and that the second one resists against passive conspiracies.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we define exchange protocols, as well as the fundamental properties that these protocols must respect and the properties related to exclusion scenarios in a multi-party setting. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted, on the first hand, to multi-party fair exchange protocols with an online TTP. In Section 3 we describe the protocol proposed by Franklin and Tsudik [7] and present our attacks on this protocol. A fixed protocol, in which participants cannot be excluded from the exchange, is described in Section 4. On the other hand, Sections 5 and 6 deal with multiparty fair exchange protocols with an offline TTP. In Section 5 we describe the protocol proposed by Bao et al. [5] and discuss about the trust relationships that it creates between the participants in the protocol. We propose a variant protocol in Section 6 in which some of these trust relationships do no longer exist. Finally, Section 7 concludes this work.
Definitions and notations
In order to define what we mean by an excluded participant, a passive conspirator or a protocol not allowing participants to be excluded, we will extend the model defined by Markowitch [12, 13] to analyse exchange protocols. We briefly recall this model before augmenting it.
Markowitch call a communicating entity an actor, and model it by means of a probabilistic interactive Turing machine. An actor communicates with other actors by sending information to one of its write-only communication tapes or by receiving information from one of its read-only communication tapes. These information travel through the communication tapes of another probabilistic interactive Turing machine representing the communication channel connecting two actors. Depending on the quality of service, three different types of communication channels are defined. The first one models a channel where messages inserted into it are delivered within a known, finite and constant amount of time.
Definition 1 [12, 13] A channel is said to be operational if and only if (1) whenever a symbol is written on the write-only communication tape, it is the last non-blank symbol read on the read-only communication tape; (2) the head corresponding to the read-only communication tape does not move towards the left and achieves a movement towards the right when a non-blank symbol is written on the write-only communication tape; and (3) the number of transitions realised right after having read a non-blank symbol on the read-only communication tape up to the writing of the very same symbol on the writeonly communication tape is bounded by a known finite constant.
The second type models a communication channel which delivers data after a finite, but unknown, amount of time. It can be straightforwardly defined from the previous definition. Finally, unreliable channels are defined as follows.
Definition 2 [12, 13] If a communication channel is neither operational nor resilient, it is said to be unreliable.
An actor is therefore defined [12, 13] as a probabilistic interactive Turing machine connected, by means of its communication tapes, to one or several communication channels.
Although not explicitly said in the literature, a protocol allowing an exchange of items is composed of a preliminary setup phase, followed by an exchange phase. Except for non-repudiation and certified email protocols, during the setup phase, actors willing to participate in a given exchange protocol execution agree on the set of actors who will take part in this protocol execution, on the items to be exchanged and on how these items will be exchanged during the exchange phase. Upon completion of that setup phase, the exchange phase is performed by means of a fair exchange protocol. Markowitch call each of those items to be exchanged a target information [12, 13] .
As usual, an actor is said to be honest if he only performs the steps of the protocol.
Definition 3 [12, 13] An exchange protocol in which n actors are involved, is a protocol during which m (≤ n) of the involved actors, if they are honest, exchange target information. The exchange is such that, during the protocol, each of those m actors receives one or several of these target information and sends one or several related target information to one or several of the m − 1 other actors (no actor sends information to himself, nor receives information from himself). The n − m actors not concerned by the target information take part in the protocol as middlemen. During the exchange protocol, non-target information can also be transmitted, and target information may be encoded segmented and/or grouped in the messages effectively transmitted.
Definition 4 [12, 13] The m actors of an exchange protocol exchanging target information are called target actors. The n − m other actors are called participating actors.
Definition 5 [12, 13] The exchanges of target information having to be performed during an exchange protocol are described by an exchange graph π, in which vertices represent the target actors and directed edges represent the sendings of target information to achieve. These arcs are labelled by the nonempty sets of target information sent by the origin to the destination of the arc, each target information being represented by a dedicated variable. An exchange graph π will always be strongly connected.
After a successful execution of an exchange protocol between honest actors, all the exchanges described by π are achieved once and only once. An actor may occur in many exchanges simultaneously; hence, we shall also consider exchange systems described by many individual exchange graphs. However, we shall assume that the target information are uniquely identified, so that each one may be attached to one and only one of the composing exchanges.
Definition 6 [12, 13] The exchanges of target information having to be performed in an exchange system are described by a set Π of exchange graphs π i , 1 ≤ i ≤ |Π|. These exchange graphs are such that no variable occurs twice around a target actor and no effective target information corresponds to more than one variable around him. The union of the different exchange graphs π i of Π is strongly connected.
Exchange graphs do not specify the manner nor the order in which the exchanges must be realised during the protocol, but correspond to a formalisation of what must be exchanged at the end of the protocol. Several different protocols (systems) can correspond to a same (set of) exchange graph(s).
The fairness property is defined on the basis of completion points.
Definition 7 [12, 13] In an exchange system, a strong completion point for an honest target actor A corresponds to a step of the protocol after which A is in one of the following actor's states:
1. For at least one exchange graph of Π, A has received all her expected target information. Moreover, for each of these exchange graphs in which A has received all her expected target information,
• all the target actors that must receive some target information sent by A received these target information, or are able to receive them regardless of A's actions;
• or all the honest target actors having provided A with her expected target information also received their expected target information (belonging to this same exchange graph), or are able to receive them regardless of A's actions.
For all the remaining exchange graphs of Π in which A is involved, no target information having to be sent by A has been received by the corresponding target actors, nor will be received in the future if A does not proceed.
2.
A did not receive any target information for which she is the intended recipient and no target information having to be sent by A has been received by the corresponding target actors, nor will be received in the future if A does not proceed.
We have now all the necessary elements in order to define the different possible flavors of fairness.
Definition 8 [12, 13] An exchange system is strictly fair when all the honest target actors are always able to reach one of their strong completion points, and these completion points are such that all the honest target actors are in the same actor's state. The behaviour (honest or not) of the participating actors and the quality (operational, resilient or unreliable) of the communication channels must be specified.
This definition models the usual definition of fairness, also known as all-ornothing fairness. The following definition is slightly weaker, but it is useful in some optimistic multi-party protocols [5, 9] .
Definition 9 [12, 13] An exchange system is strongly fair when all the honest target actors are always able to reach one of their strong completion points. The behaviour (honest or not) of the participating actors and the quality (operational, resilient or unreliable) of the communication channels must be specified.
For an exchange protocol to be secure, in addition to one of the previously defined flavors of fairness, the viability (or effectiveness) and the timeliness properties also have to be respected. The former means that if all the target actors are willing to perform the protocol and if no problem occurs, then the exchange is always achieved. The latter guarantees that the protocol will finish, for all the honest target actors, in a finite amount of time, the exchange having taken place or not.
We are now able to extend this model, in the framework of multi-party exchange protocols, in order to deal with exclusions of target actors.
Definition 10 An honest target actor A of an exchange system Π is said to be excluded from a protocol execution either if she is not able to reach one of her strong completion points, or if she has reached one of her strong completion points in the second actor's state and at least one honest target actor involved in Π has reached one of his strong completion points in the first actor's state.
As we will see, in optimistic protocols it seems impossible to avoid exclusions. Therefore, we think that it is important in this context to give possible excluded target actors the opportunity of proving that they have been excluded. From a practical point of view, the following definition may thus be useful to enable target actors to be compensated for having been excluded.
Definition 11
An honest target actor is said to be weakly excluded from a protocol execution when he can prove to a particular actor (a judge), by means of another protocol, that he has been excluded from this protocol execution.
We will call an honest target actor who does not do anything in order to prevent possible excluded target actors from seeing him as a dishonest target actor, a passive conspirator.
Definition 12 A protocol execution is said with passive conspirators associated with a coalition of dishonest target actors excluding some other target actors from the protocol execution, if at least one honest target actor not being excluded (we call her the passive conspirator A) does not send to at least one of the possible excluded target actors (we call him B) a specific non-target information. This non-target information is such that it allows to notify B that if the protocol execution respects the exchange graphs of Π, then B should receive the target information of these exchange graphs for which he is the intended recipient.
In order not to be a possible passive conspirator, this definition only requires that A sends a non-target information to all the remaining target actors notifying them that if the exchange protocol execution respects the exchange graphs of Π, then the latter should receive their expected target information. It is therefore possible that this non-target information is not received by some target actors due to a poor communication channel quality. But thanks to the non-target information, possible excluded actors will realise that they are excluded if they do not receive anything else, and, depending on the protocol, they will be able to become weakly excluded.
Definition 13 A multi-party exchange protocol is strongly exclusion-free if no honest target actor can ever be excluded.
Note that this definition means that all the target actors are always able to reach one of their strong completion points, and that these completion points are such that all the honest target actors are in the same actor's state. This corresponds, word for word, to the definition of a strictly fair protocol. We can therefore conclude that a multi-party exchange protocol is strongly exclusionfree if and only if it is strictly fair.
We think that by looking for potential exclusion scenarios it is possible to analyse more deeply whether a multi-party protocol really respects the fairness property or not. This new definition can thus be of interest in this context.
Definition 14
A multi-party exchange protocol is weakly exclusion-free if either at least one honest target actor is weakly excluded and the remaining honest target actors have all reached one of their strong completion points in the first actor's state, or all the honest target actors reach a strong completion point such that all those target actors are in the same actor's state.
We point out that in a protocol not providing strong exclusion-freeness any honest target actor has to trust the remaining target actors not to exclude him (even weakly) from the protocol execution.
Through the remaining of this paper we will use the following notations:
• X → Y : m denotes actor X sending a message m to actor Y ;
• X ⇒ Y : m denotes actor X multicasting a message m to the set of actors Y (a one-to-many communication);
• X ⇒ : m denotes actor X broadcasting a message m (a one-to-any communication);
• X ← Y : m denotes actor X retrieving a message m from a read-only public directory managed by actor Y ;
• E X (p) is the result of applying an asymmetric encryption algorithm E to the plaintext p with the actor X's public key;
• D X (c) is the result of applying an asymmetric decryption algorithm D to the ciphertext c with X's secret key;
• S X (i) denotes the digital signature of actor X on the information i;
• f x is a publicly known flag indicating the purpose of a message in a given protocol, where x identifies the corresponding message in that protocol;
• label is an information identifying a protocol run (it will be precisely defined for each protocol).
Franklin and Tsudik's fair exchange protocol
We describe here the multi-party fair exchange protocol with an online trusted third party proposed by Franklin and Tsudik [7] . The protocol assumes that the exchange is cyclic, i.e. a target actor P i , i ∈ [1, n], sends his target information m i to P i+1 in exchange for P i−1 's target information m i−1 ; P n sends his target information to P 1 .
In their protocol, the authors assume the presence of a third party which is semi-trusted. Such a third party is trusted to ensure the fairness during a protocol run, but as long as all the actors involved in the protocol remain honest the semi-trusted third party will not succeed in learning the exchanged target information. The authors also consider that all the exchanged messages are private and authentic.
The protocol is based on a homomorphic one-way function f and a n-variable function F n such that
The authors proposed to use f (y) = y 2 mod N and F n (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) = y 2 1 · y 2 · · · y n mod N , where N is the product of two large distinct primes.
At the end of the setup phase:
• each target actor knows (at least) the identity of the previous and the next target actor in the ring;
• the target actors have agreed on the identity of the TTP that will be contacted during the protocol execution and on the instance of the functions f and F that will be used;
• and the description of the target information to be exchanged, f (m i ), ∀i ∈ [1, n], are made public.
The protocol
Each target actor P i begins the protocol by randomly choosing a value R i and sending it to P i+1 .
Upon receiving R i−1 , each target actor
and sends them to the TTP along with f (R i ).
The TTP compares the received A i and tests if they are all equal. We point out that Franklin and Tsudik do not state from which moment in time the TTP should perform this test. For example, a deadline t after which the TTP can no longer be contacted could have been defined. It would also have been possible to assume that the TTP waits to receive n messages, or even that the TTP knows the identity of all the target actors for each protocol execution. However, as we will show below, none of these classical solutions, even when used together, ensure the fairness property.
So, if the above test succeeds, Franklin and Tsudik ask the TTP to compute
). The latter value should be equal to f (m 1 · · · m n ); the TTP verifies thus whether one A i is equal to this value. If these two tests succeed, the TTP broadcasts
After having received C from the TTP, each P i can verify for which
, and obtain then m i−1 .
Here is a summary of that protocol:
Protocol 1 Franklin and Tsudik's fair exchange protocol
Franklin and Tsudik claimed in a sketch of proof [7] that their protocol was correct. We show below that this is not true by describing two attacks on this protocol.
A first attack
Unfortunately, the above protocol is not fair. When communicating with the TTP, a target actor, say P i , can randomly choose a valueR distinct from the R i transmitted to P i+1 at the previous step of the protocol and can therefore send to the TTP the "normal" A i , C i = m i ·R −1 and f (R).
The TTP will not be able to realise that the valueR provided by P i is different from the value R i received by P i+1 . Indeed, the TTP compares all the received
An, Cn, f (rn) Figure 1 : An exclusion scenario
, which are not related to R i norR, and computes
which should be equal to any A j .
Therefore, P i+1 will obtain from the TTP the set of all C j , where
Unfortunately, for P i+1 this last equality will never be verified. He will not be able to retrieve his expected target information and, regardless of the solution used by the TTP to determine the moment at which the exchange can be resolved, the fairness property will thus be broken.
As a result, we have that P i excludes P i+1 from the exchange (P i+1 is not able to reach one of his strong completion points) with the passive assent of the remaining target actors, who become passive conspirators of P i .
A second attack
We present now a second exclusion attack with passive conspirators. Suppose that P i decides to exclude P i+1 from the exchange. If the TTP resolves the exchange without knowing the identities of all the target actors and if the oneway function f is, as in [7] , such that f (a) · f (b) = f (ab), which with discrete arithmetic one-way functions is a reasonable assumption, then P i can act as described below ( Figure 1 ; the information sent by P i is detailed in the textual description).
P i follows normally the protocol, except that he does not send his random value R i to P i+1 . The protocol does not specify that the target actors have to wait to receive the random value from the previous target actor in the ring before sending their own random value to the next target actor. Therefore, as for the remaining target actors, P i+1 sends his random value to P i+2 . The only target actor having not received his expected random value is then P i+1 . In order to remain in a fair state, P i+1 does not continue the protocol, as he will not be able to retrieve m i without R i .
All the target actors except P i and P i+1 contact the TTP as described in the second step of the protocol. P i+1 does not send anything. If the TTP resolves the exchange at the time specified by a deadline t, P i contacts the TTP by sending to the latter
which is equal to all the A j , and cannot therefore detect that P i+1 has not contacted it.
On the other hand, if the TTP resolves the exchange once it has received n messages (possibly before a deadline t), P i sends the message that he should normally send according to the protocol, as well as a second message containing
, whereR is a randomly chosen value. Again, all the tests performed by the TTP succeed, and this participating actor cannot detect that P i+1 has not contacted it.
Note that P i+1 is excluded but remains in a fair state (he does not receive m i and does not send m i+1 ). However, P i+2 sends his target information m i+2 without receiving P i+1 's target information m i+1 , and he is thus not able to reach one of his strong completion points. Fairness is then broken. This attack allows P i to exclude P i+1 and P i+2 with the passive assent of the remaining target actors. Therefore, under our assumptions, this protocol is not strongly nor weakly exclusion-free, it implies passive conspirators and does not respect the fairness property.
We can thus see that, in this protocol, the exclusion of target actors from the exchange leads to a loss of fairness and prevents the protocol from being implementable in an electronic commerce application. Moreover, the existence of passive conspirators when an exclusion occurs may induce excluded target actors to refuse any future transaction with the remaining target actors, which may have a negative effect on the excluded target actor's confidence towards electronic commerce and will damage the passive conspirator's reputation.
A strongly exclusion-free fair exchange protocol
The protocol that we describe in this section is a fixed version of the multi-party fair exchange protocol with an online trusted third party described above. The exchange topology of this protocol describes also a ring and the communication channels between target actors may be unreliable, while those used between each target actor and the TTP are assumed to be resilient. Functions f and F are defined as for the original protocol.
• all the target actors have agreed on the identity of the TTP that will be contacted during the protocol execution and on the instance of the functions f and F that will be used;
• each target actor knows the set P = {P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P n−1 } of identities of all the target actors in the exchange and (at least) the identity of the previous and the next target actor in the ring;
• the description of the target information to be exchanged, f (m i ), ∀i ∈ [0, n − 1], are made public;
• a deadline t before which the TTP should have received all the necessary information in order to successfully complete the protocol has been agreed by all the target actors;
• and a label, identifying a protocol run and resulting from applying the concatenation of P, the description of the target information expected by each target actor (in the order found in P), and of the deadline t (in this order) to a one-way collision-resistant hash function, is known by all the target actors.
During the protocol, when receiving a signed message, each actor checks the validity of the signature. If the verification fails, then the message is ignored.
The protocol
As in the original protocol, each target actor P i , ∀i ∈ [0, n − 1], randomly chooses a value R i and sends it, in a private way, to P i+1 .
Upon receiving
and sends E TTP (C i ) to the TTP along with f (R i ) and f (R i−1 ), the label, the set P of target actors, and the deadline t.
In order to avoid attacks from actors not belonging to P, the TTP verifies for each received message if its sender is included in the set P found in the message. The TTP also verifies if this set, the public information corresponding to all the target actors in P, and t are consistent with the label that has been sent. If so, the TTP stores the received message. Otherwise, it discards the message and informs its sender of this.
At time t, the TTP verifies if the set of identities of the target actors having contacted it with the same label is equal to the corresponding set P. As shown in the first attack for the previous protocol, this test is not sufficient to prevent exclusions. It is also necessary for the TTP to be sure that the random values of the first step have been properly exchanged, i.e. the TTP checks if for each i ∈ [0, n − 1] the f (R i ) sent by P i is equal to the f (R i ) sent by P i+1 and if the f (R i−1 ) sent by P i is equal to the f (R i−1 ) sent by P i−1 .
If these two firsts checks succeed, the TTP has still to verify whether each target actor P i will be able to recover his expected target information from C i−1 , as this last value could be intentionally malformed. More precisely, the TTP checks if, for each i
Note that [11] the technique used in the original protocol (testing whether
is not sufficient to verify if each target actor will be able to recover his expected target information, since two dishonest target actors, say P j and P k , could send to the TTP respectively
j and therefore exclude P j+1 and P k+1 , who will not be able to recover their expected target information. The well-formedness of the received C i has thus to be verified individually for each C i .
Finally, if all these tests succeed, the TTP multicasts C = {C j | 0 ≤ j ≤ n−1} to all the target actors. Any P i can therefore verify for which C j , with j ∈ [0, n−1], f (C j · R i−1 ) = f (m i−1 ) holds, and can retrieve m i−1 . Otherwise, if any of the above tests fails, the TTP multicasts to all the target actors a failure message.
Here are the three steps of that protocol:
Protocol 2 A strongly exclusion-free fair exchange protocol 1. ∀i ∈ [0, n − 1]:
. if the tests succeed TTP ⇒ P : f success , P, label , C, S TTP ( ) else TTP ⇒ P : f failure , P, label , S TTP ( )
Analysis
Property 1 The first and last steps of the protocol are strong completion points for all the target actors.
Property 2
The protocol is strictly fair.
Proof: If some target actors stop the protocol after performing the first step (or before), all the target actors will be able to reach one of their strong completion points and these completion points will be such that all the honest target actors will be in the second state of the definition of a strong completion point. Now, after performing the second step of the protocol, no target actor has interest in stopping the protocol because he might not receive his expected target information. If at time t the TTP has not received all the necessary messages in order to complete the protocol or if one of these messages induces a test failure, then the TTP will multicast a failure message to all the target actors and no target information will be exchanged. Otherwise, the TTP will multicast C to all the target actors, who will therefore receive their expected target information.
In both cases, thanks to the assumed resiliency of the communication channels with the TTP, all the honest target actors will be able to reach their strong completion point at the third step of the protocol. In the first scenario, these strong completion points will be such that all the honest target actors will be in the second state of the definition of a strong completion point. In the second scenario, these strong completion points will be such that all the honest target actors will be in the first state of this definition.
Corollary 3
As the protocol is strictly fair, it respects the strong exclusionfreeness property.
Property 4
The protocol is viable and respects the timeliness property.
Conclusion
Regardless robust protocol design [1] , fixing the exclusion problems of the original protocol is not as simple as adding f (R i−1 ) to the second message of the protocol. The TTP must assure strict fairness by verifying whether all the target actors have contacted it, whether all the random values of the first step of the protocol have been properly exchanged and whether all the target information can be extracted from C with the help of all the f (R i−1 ). While the first and last steps of this protocol remain quite similar to those of the original protocol, the tests realised by the TTP are totally different.
Bao et al.'s fair exchange protocol
We now focus on the study of exclusions in the framework of the optimistic multi-party fair exchange protocol proposed by Bao et al. [5] . The exchange topology is a ring.
• all the target actors in the exchange have agreed on the identity of the TTP that will be contacted if a problem occurs and know their own position in the ring;
• the identity of P 0 , the target actor that initiates the exchange, is known by the TTP;
• and the description of the target information to be exchanged, f (m i ), with i ∈ [0, n − 1], are made public (f is defined hereunder).
Before describing the protocol, let us explain the technique of verifiable encryption schemes, used in this protocol.
Verifiable encryption schemes
To illustrate the aim of this technique, imagine a scenario with a trusted third party and two actors, Alice and Bob, who know the public encryption key of this TTP. And let f be a one-way function.
Alice knows a secret information i, with f (i) being public, that Bob aims to obtain. Alice can use a verifiable encryption scheme to deliver this information to Bob in two steps as follows. She encrypts i with the TTP's public key in order to produce c = E TTP (i), generates a certificate cert A = certify(i, c, TTP ) using a public algorithm certify, and sends c and cert A to Bob.
Bob checks that cert A is a correct certificate by using a public algorithm verify such that verify(c, cert A , f (i), TTP ) = yes if and only if f (D TTP (c)) = f (i).
Bob is then convinced that c is indeed the encryption of i with the TTP's public key. Later, Bob will be able to obtain i either directly from Alice or by asking the TTP to decrypt c.
A verifiable encryption scheme must thus satisfy [5] the two following properties:
• it is computationally unfeasible for Alice to generate a certificate cert A such that verify(c, cert A , f (i), TTP ) = yes, while f (D TTP (c)) = f (i);
• and it is computationally unfeasible for Bob to get i from c without knowing the TTP's secret decryption key.
Asokan et al. gave [4] some examples of verifiable encryption schemes implementations. Bao et al. proposed [5] an implementation of a non-interactive scheme, corresponding to the description above.
Main protocol
P 0 begins the main protocol by sending to P 1 the ciphertext c 0 of the target information m 0 encrypted with the TTP's public key, along with a certificate cert 0 proving, as described above, that c 0 is indeed the ciphertext of m 0 .
After receiving (c 0 , cert 0 ), P 1 checks cert 0 . If this certificate is valid, he encrypts m 1 and sends (c 1 , cert 1 ) to P 2 . For i = 2, 3, . . . , n − 1, target actor P i behaves similarly.
When P 0 receives (c n−1 , cert n−1 ) he checks the certificate cert n−1 and, if it is valid, he sends the target information m 0 to P 1 . For i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, after receiving m i−1 from target actor P i−1 , P i sends the target information m i to P i+1 .
These are the two rounds of the main protocol:
Protocol 3 Bao et al.'s fair exchange protocol: main protocol 1. For i = 0, . . . , n − 1:
2. For i = 0, . . . , n − 1:
Recovery protocol
If all the target actors (and the communication channels between them) behave correctly, after the main protocol execution each target actor should obtain his expected target information. However, if some P i does not receive m i−1 (within a reasonable amount of time), he has to run the following recovery protocol.
P i begins this protocol by sending (c i−1 , cert i−1 ) to the TTP. The latter checks the certificate cert i−1 , and, if it is valid and if P i = P 0 , waits for the time 1 it would take to P 0 to obtain m n−1 if no problem occurs, before asking P 0 if he has received a valid (c n−1 , cert n−1 ) during the first step of the main protocol.
Only if P 0 answers yes, the TTP will accept to decrypt the corresponding c i−1 . On the other hand, if the certificate is valid and if the target actor running the recovery protocol is P 0 , the TTP decrypts c n−1 and considers that he has answered yes to the above question.
The TTP does not contact P 0 each time that some other target actor runs the recovery protocol: if P 0 answered yes in the first recovery execution then the TTP will accept further recovery requests; otherwise the TTP will reply with an abort message. The above call to P 0 prevents a target actor P i from getting c i−1 decrypted without having sent (c i , cert i ).
Here are the four steps of the recovery protocol, initiated by some P i having not received m i−1 . Steps 2 and 3 are only executed the first time that this protocol is invoked. 
Analysis
This protocol respects the strong fairness property (note that the protocol of Section 4 was strictly fair). We refer the reader to the original paper [5] for the details.
Exclusions and passive conspiracies
As pointed out by Bao et al. [5] , in that protocol, two or more target actors can collude in order to exclude some other target actors from the exchange. Consider for example that P 0 colludes with P i . The attack would take place as follows ( Figure 2 ).
The first step of the main protocol is correctly executed until P i receives the message (c i−1 , cert i−1 ) from P i−1 . Instead of sending (c i , cert i ) to P i+1 , P i runs the recovery protocol in order to get c i−1 decrypted by the TTP. The latter asks then P 0 if he has received (c n−1 , cert n−1 ), P 0 answers with a false yes, and the TTP decrypts c i−1 . P i will obtain m i−1 without having sent (c i , cert i ). This causes no harm as long as the TTP correctly follows the protocol: P 1 to P i−1 will be able to run the recovery protocol, obtain respectively m 0 to m i−2 and reach their strong completion point in the first actor's state at the third step of the recovery protocol; and P i+1 to P n−1 will not receive nor send anything: they will be simply excluded from the exchange, and can thus be seen to be in the second state of the definition of a strong completion point.
Even if the strong fairness property is respected (all the honest target actors reach one of their strong completion points, but in different actor's states), in the coalition described above, P 1 to P i−1 become passive conspirators. They must trust P 0 not to answer with a false yes to the TTP during the recovery protocol. In fact, as P i could for example collude with P i+2 in order to exclude P i+1 from the exchange (merely by bypassing P i+1 and directly contacting P i+2 ), target actors in that protocol have to trust each other not to become passive conspirators of a coalition excluding some other target actors from the exchange.
On the other hand, we note that even if P 0 decides to send a false abort to the TTP during the recovery protocol, strong fairness is still preserved. Once the first step of the main protocol has been successfully completed, P 0 sends m 0 to P 1 and target actors P 1 to P i−1 behave similarly. If P i decides not to send the correct m i , or if m i is lost, after a certain amount of time P i+1 will realise that he must run the recovery protocol in order to obtain m i . However, if P 0 sends a false abort to the TTP, the protocol will be terminated without P i+1 receiving m i . If the TTP behaves correctly, P 0 will be the only target actor in a non-fair state at the end of the protocol, and P i+1 to P n−1 will be excluded.
In this protocol, fairness is achieved even if exclusions occur. However, as for the Franklin and Tsudik's protocol, the existence of passive conspirators is an adverse consequence for any honest target actor. We believe that this remains unacceptable for a practical electronic commerce application.
A weakly exclusion-free fair exchange protocol
We propose now a variant of the multi-party fair exchange protocol with an offline trusted third party described above. The aim of this new protocol is to no longer require target actors to trust each other not to become passive conspirators of a coalition excluding some other target actors, and allow possible excluded target actors to become weakly excluded. The exchange topology is a ring. The communication channels between target actors may be unreliable and those between each target actor and the TTP are assumed to be resilient.
• all the target actors have agreed on the identity of the TTP that will be contacted if a problem occurs and know their own position in the ring;
• the identity of P 0 , the target actor that initiates the exchange, is known by all the target actors as well as by the TTP, and the address of a public read-only directory managed by P 0 is assumed to be associated with his identity;
• each target actor knows the set P = {P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P n−1 } of identities of all the target actors in the exchange;
• and a label, identifying a protocol run and resulting from applying the concatenation of P and of the description of all the target information to be exchanged (in this order) to a one-way collision-resistant hash function, is known by all the target actors.
Main protocol
As in the original protocol, P 0 begins the main protocol by sending to P 1 the ciphertext c 0 of the target information m 0 , the certificate cert 0 proving that c 0 is indeed the ciphertext of m 0 encrypted with the TTP's public key, and his signature on these information.
After receiving (c 0 , cert 0 ) from P 0 , if cert 0 is valid, P 1 encrypts m 1 and sends (c 1 , cert 1 ), digitally signed, to P 2 . For i = 2, 3, . . . , n − 1, each P i behaves similarly.
Upon P 0 receiving (c n−1 , cert n−1 ), if the certificate sent by P n−1 is valid, P 0 stores (label , E TTP (S P 0 (label ))) in his public directory and verifies, by consulting the logs of this public directory, if the TTP has tried to perform a recovery before he stored this encrypted signature. As it will be described below, the TTP consults this public directory when it is invoked for the first time. Thus, if a recovery has not been invoked yet for this protocol execution, P 0 multicasts S P 0 (label ) to the set P \ P 0 of target actors.
This signature is a non-target information representing the successful completion (in P 0 's opinion) of the first step of the protocol, that will allow nonexcluded honest target actors not to become potential passive conspirators. By sending it to possible excluded actors, these honest target actors will be able to inform the possible excluded actors that, if the exchange protocol execution respects the exchange graph involving all the target actors, then the possible excluded actors should receive their expected target information.
In addition to this signature, P 0 sends the target information m 0 to P 1 , digitally signed. When P i , with i ∈ [1, n−1], receives a valid S P 0 (label ) for the first time, he multicasts this signature to P \P i . Upon receiving such a signature and m i−1 from P i−1 , P i sends m i to P i+1 , digitally signed.
Here is a summary of the main protocol:
Protocol 5 A weakly exclusion-free fair exchange protocol: main protocol 1. For i = 0, . . . , n − 1:
. . , n − 1:
Recovery protocol
If some P i does not receive m i−1 during the main protocol, he has to run the following recovery protocol in order to ask the TTP to decrypt c i−1 . P i should also invoke this protocol if he does not receive S P 0 (label ), in order to receive this signature and be able to send it to possible excluded target actors afterwards.
P i begins this protocol by sending c i−1 and cert i−1 to the TTP, along with the label, the set P of target actors, and his digital signature on all this information.
In order to avoid attacks from actors not belonging to P, the TTP verifies for each received message if its sender is included in the set P found in the message. The TTP also verifies if this set and the public information corresponding to all the actors in P are consistent with the label that has been sent. If not, the TTP discards the message.
The first time that the TTP is invoked for a protocol execution identified by the label contained in a received message, it tries to fetch (label , E TTP (S P 0 (label ))) from the public directory managed by P 0 . If this signature can be retrieved and properly verified, that is to say if the first step of the main protocol is considered as successfully completed, then the TTP will accept the current as well as future recovery requests concerning this label. Otherwise, it will always reply with a failure message.
If the TTP accepts recovery requests, then it will verify if the certificate cert i−1 is correct. If it is the case, the TTP decrypts c i−1 and sends S P 0 (label ) and m i−1 to P i . If not, it sends an error message to P i (asking him to resend a correct message).
The three steps of the recovery protocol for some P i having not received m i−1 or S P 0 (label ) are shown below.
Step 2 is only performed the first time that this protocol is invoked.
Protocol 6 A weakly exclusion-free fair exchange protocol: recovery protocol 1.
. a. if the TTP rejects recovery requests TTP → P i : f failure , P i , label , S TTP ( ) b. else if the tests succeed
Analysis
Property 5 The first step of the main protocol is a strong completion point in the second actor's state for the target actor P 0 .
Property 6
The third step of the main protocol and the step 3b of the recovery protocol are strong completion points in the first actor's state for the target actor P 0 .
Property 7
The third step of the main protocol is a strong completion point for a target actor P i , with i ∈ [1, n − 1].
Proof: We consider here that the TTP always accepts recoveries, the case where the TTP rejects recoveries will be discussed in Property 8. Several scenarios are possible for an honest target actor P i :
• if P i receives m i−1 from P i−1 and has received S P 0 (label ), then he performs the third step of the main protocol. At that moment, P i has received all the target information that he expected and has sent his target information to P i+1 . As an honest P i−1 would not have sent m i−1 if he would have not received m i−2 (in this setting P 0 can always obtain m n−1 ), P i ends the protocol in the first state of the definition of a strong completion point.
• if P i does not receive m i−1 from P i−1 but has received S P 0 (label ), then he performs the recovery protocol, obtains his expected target information and performs the third step of the main protocol. As an honest P i−1 would not have sent (c i−1 , cert i−1 ) if he would have not received (c i−2 , cert i−2 ), then P i−1 is also able to obtain his expected target information and P i ends the protocol in the first state of the definition of a strong completion point.
• suppose now that P i has received m i−1 from P i−1 but has not received S P 0 (label ). As an honest P i−1 would not have sent m i−1 if he would have not received m i−2 , P i has already reached at that moment the first state of the definition of a strong completion point. However, an honest P i will try to perform the recovery protocol, obtain S P 0 (label ) and perform the third step of the main protocol.
• if P i does neither receive m i−1 from P i−1 nor S P 0 (label ), P i needs to contact the TTP in order to obtain his expected target information. By doing so, P i will receive S P 0 (label ) as well as m i−1 , and will thus be able to perform the third step of the main protocol. As an honest P i−1 would not have sent (c i−1 , cert i−1 ) if he would have not received (c i−2 , cert i−2 ), P i−1 will also be able to obtain his expected target information. P i will therefore end the protocol in the first state of the definition of a strong completion point.
Property 8
The step 3a of the recovery protocol is a strong completion point for a target actor P i , with i ∈ [1, n − 1].
Proof: We consider here that the TTP always rejects recovery requests. Two scenarios are possible for an honest target actor P i :
• if P i does not receive m i−1 from P i−1 but has received S P 0 (label ), then he performs the recovery protocol and obtains a failure message from the TTP. P i ends therefore the protocol in the second state of the definition of a strong completion point since P i will not send m i and P i+1 will not be able to obtain his expected target information from the TTP.
• suppose now that P i has neither received m i−1 from P i−1 nor S P 0 (label ). P i will therefore perform the recovery protocol. As the TTP rejects recovery requests, P i will receive a failure message and, as in the previous scenario, will end the protocol in the second state of the definition of a strong completion point.
Property 9
The protocol is strongly fair.
Proof: After the first step of the main protocol only P 0 can stop the protocol. Any other target actor P i , with i ∈ [1, n − 1], has no interest in stopping the protocol because P 0 could perform the second step of the main protocol and P i+1 could therefore successfully ask the TTP to recover m i . However, if P 0 stops the protocol at that point, no remaining target actor could successfully invoke the recovery protocol and no target information would be exchanged. All these target actors would reach their strong completion point at the step 3a of the recovery protocol as shown in Property 8. As all the target actors would be in the second state of the definition of a strong completion point, strict fairness would be achieved.
After performing the second step of the main protocol, P 0 has no interest in stopping the protocol by the same argument as above. P 0 has therefore to wait for m n−1 or invoke the recovery protocol in order to reach, respectively, his strong completion point at the third step of the main protocol or at the step 3b of the recovery protocol. As shown in Property 7, all the remaining honest target actors having received their expected ciphertext and certificate at the first step of the protocol are always able to reach their respective strong completion point at the third step of the main protocol. Honest target actors having not received their expected ciphertext and certificate (for example, because their respective neighbours have excluded them) will be waiting for the protocol to begin; they can thus be seen to be in the second state of the definition of a strong completion point. Strong fairness is therefore achieved.
Finally, if P 0 performs the second step of the main protocol but does not store (label , E TTP (S P 0 (label ))) in his public directory, the third step of the main protocol will be properly performed until a target actor invokes the recovery protocol, as the TTP will reject recoveries. Honest target actors having received their expected target information and S P 0 (label ) will reach their strong completion point at the third step of the main protocol. Remaining honest target actors will either reach their strong completion point at step 3a of the recovery protocol if they have been involved in the first step of the main protocol, or remain in the second actor's state otherwise. The protocol is thus strongly fair.
Note that due to dishonest target actors, all honest target actors do not necessarily end the protocol in the same state of the definition of a strong completion point, i.e. target actors reaching the second state of this definition will be considered as being excluded from the exchange. We will further discuss this in the following subsection.
Property 10
Property 11
The protocol allow honest target actors not to become passive conspirators excluding other target actors from the exchange.
Proof: The existence of the non-target information S P 0 (label ) indicates that P 0 considers that the first step of the main protocol has successfully ended and that the two remaining steps of the main protocol can be performed. Multicasting S P 0 (label ) allows therefore honest target actors being involved in the last step of the main protocol to inform possible target actors having not received the first message of the main protocol, i.e. being excluded, that the exchange is taking place. It is thus up to each target actor obtaining this non-target information to decide whether multicast S P 0 (label ) to all the remaining target actors or not, i.e. whether be honest or contribute to a possible existing coalition excluding target actors from the protocol execution.
Complaint protocol
If an honest target actor receives the ciphertext of the expected target information and the corresponding certificate during the first step of the main protocol, then it will be possible for him to run the recovery protocol. Only if S P 0 (label ) is not present in P 0 's public directory, the TTP will reply with a failure message. This message will allow the recipient of this message to prove that he has been excluded (i.e. he is weakly excluded) in case other target actors have reached the first state of the definition of a strong completion point.
Otherwise, if an honest target actor does not receive this ciphertext and the corresponding certificate but receives S P 0 (label ), he will be able to prove to an external party, by executing the following complaint protocol with the TTP, that he has been excluded, i.e. he is weakly excluded.
A target actor P i , with i ∈ [0, n − 1], begins this complaint protocol by sending (label , P, S P 0 (label )) to the TTP. The latter checks if P i belongs to the set P, if P is consistent with the label and if S P 0 (label ) is a valid signature. If so, the TTP multicasts the signature of P 0 on the label to the target actors belonging to P \ P i and asks each of them to provide the signature received during the first step of the main protocol.
Due to the resiliency of the communication channels between each target actor and the TTP, all the target actors receive S P 0 (label ) at that moment. Other excluded target actors having not received previously this signature can therefore also invoke the complaint protocol.
If after a deadline chosen by the TTP according to the communication channels quality, none of the remaining target actors is able to present the signature that P i should have issued during the first step of the main protocol, the TTP will issue an affidavit attesting that something wrong happened during the protocol. Two (indistinguishable) cases are possible: either an honest target actor was excluded from the exchange, or a dishonest target actor was able to run the complaint protocol because the following target actor in the ring actively involved in the exchange (intentionally) did not provide to the TTP the signature received from the former actor at the first step of the main protocol.
Otherwise, if P i 's signature is provided, the TTP rejects his complaint, as an honest target actor only performs the first step of the main protocol (and sends the corresponding signature) if he receives (c i−1 , cert i−1 ).
Here is a summary of that protocol. Steps 2 and 3 are only executed the first time that this protocol is invoked for a given exchange.
Step 4 only occurs if the TTP does not receive the signature that P i should have issued during the first step of the main protocol.
Protocol 7 A weakly exclusion-free fair exchange protocol: complaint protocol
Two comments arise while looking at this protocol. The first one is that it is possible that, if there are excluded target actors, none of them receives the signature of P 0 on the label during the main protocol. In that case, either there is a problem with the communication channels (and the signatures sent by honest target actors are not received by the excluded actors) or there are no honest target actors having realised the exchange. This coalition of a group of target actors in order to exclude all the remaining actors does not seem very interesting to us because, as the strong fairness property is assured for excluded entities, dishonest target actors will not be able to obtain any target information from these excluded actors, and so they do not need other actors in order to carry out an exchange.
However, if there is a problem with the communication channels and S P 0 (label ) is not received by any excluded actor, then the complaint protocol cannot be invoked by the excluded target actors. Honest non-excluded target actors can therefore run the complaint protocol, and send as well to the TTP the signature that they have received at the first step of the main protocol, if they do not receive S P 0 (label ) from all the other target actors during the main protocol.
The second comment is the following. Suppose that P i has invoked the complaint protocol. P has been defined as a set of target actors. If all the target actors in P \ P i reply as expected to the second message of that protocol, the TTP will know how the signatures from the first step of the main protocol have been exchanged and will know the disposition of the (non-excluded) target actors in the ring. However, the TTP will not be able to determine where the excluded actor P i should be, as he could be between any couple of target actors.
Otherwise, if P is defined as an ordered set according to the agreed topology, it will be possible for the TTP to determine the identity of at least one target actor having actively contributed to the coalition. Consider for example the complaint protocol execution shown in Figure 3 . Target actors P 1 , P 4 and P 5 have succeeded in excluding P 2 and P 3 from the protocol, without the consent of P 0 . The complaint protocol is invoked (by P 0 , P 2 or P 3 ) and the TTP asks for the signatures exchanged during the first step of the main protocol. Target actors P 0 and P 1 reply honestly with the signatures of P 5 and P 0 respectively, and P 2 and P 3 join the complaint protocol execution by claiming to have been excluded from the exchange. A complaint scenario P 4 and P 5 can reply in several different ways. P 5 cannot pretend to be excluded because the TTP receives his signature from P 0 . He can neither ignore the TTP's demand because, as the communication channel between him and the TTP is resilient, this will show that he has something to hide. If he does not want to be declared as a conspirator, P 5 must betray the coalition and reply with P 4 's signature. Now, if P 4 replies with P 1 's signature, then the TTP will be able to determine that at least P 1 and P 4 have conspired in order to exclude P 2 and P 3 from the exchange. If he decides not to answer, then, independently of P 5 's reply, the TTP will be able to consider that P 4 has contributed to the coalition. Finally, if P 4 invokes the complaint protocol, only if P 5 sends P 4 's signature to the TTP, the latter will be able to conclude that P 4 is a member of the coalition.
Property 12 This complaint protocol allows the optimistic multi-party fair exchange protocol described above to be weakly exclusion-free.
Dishonest target actors will either wrongly invoke the complaint protocol or stop the protocol. Stopping the protocol is not a problem because they will not receive any kind of affidavit from the TTP. If they invoke the complaint protocol they may receive an affidavit, however this does not prevent true excluded target actors from obtaining an evidence attesting having been excluded, and become weakly excluded.
Conclusion
In this optimistic protocol there is no way to prevent P i and P i+2 , for example, from colluding in order to exclude P i+1 from the exchange. Fortunately, the protocol remains strongly fair, there will not be passive conspirators and, moreover, P i+1 will be able to prove to an external actor that he has been excluded. But he will not be able to obtain its expected target information. This local drawback prevents this protocol from respecting the strong exclusion-freeness property.
The proposed protocol is very similar to the protocol of Bao et al. from a structural point of view. Moreover, it also requires that target actors trust each other not to be excluded from a protocol execution. However, contrary to the original protocol, it allows target actors not to become passive conspirators excluding some other target actors from the protocol execution. Therefore, target actors do no longer need to trust each other not to become passive conspirators. Trust relationships are reduced by increasing communication needs. It is not easy to compare this reduction of trust relationships with the resulting increase of communication needs. However, the latter is measurable, unlike trust aspects.
Final remarks
In this paper, we have studied exclusion scenarios in the framework of multiparty fair exchange protocols, as well as the related trust relationships that may exist between target actors. We have seen that exclusions may lead to a loss of fairness and that the existence of passive conspirators may improperly disable future commercial transactions with them. None of these events must occur in order to electronic commerce transactions involving more than two entities to be successful.
From a theoretical point of view, we think that, due to its close connection with the fairness properties, exclusion-freeness can be an interesting property to consider when designing new multi-party exchange protocols, in order to analyse more deeply if the fairness property is really respected.
Finally, as discussed above, the protocol with an online TTP respects the strong exclusion-freeness property. However, this is not the case for our optimistic protocol. Whether strictly fair optimistic multi-party fair exchange protocols exist remains an open question to us.
